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The theory of language must predict the possible thought—signal (or meaning—sound
or sign) pairings of a language. We argue for a Meaning First architecture of language
where a thought structure is generated first. The thought structure is then realized
using language to communicate the thought, to memorize it, or perhaps with another
purpose. Our view contrasts with the T-model architecture of mainstream generative
grammar, according to which distinct phrase-structural representations—Phonetic Form
(PF) for articulation, Logical Form (LF) for interpretation—are generated within the
grammar. At the same time, our view differs from early transformational grammar and
generative semantics: We view the relationship between the thought structure and the
corresponding signal as one of compression. We specify a formal sketch of compression
as a choice between multiple possible pronounciations balancing the desire to transmit
information against the effort of pronounciation. The Meaning First architecture allows
a greater degree of independence between thought structures and the linguistic signal.
We present three arguments favoring this type of independence. First we argue that
scopal properties can be better explained if we only compare thought structures
independent of the their realization as a sentence. Secondly, we argue that Meaning
First architecture allows contentful late insertion, an idea that has been argued for in
Distributed Morphology already, but as we argue is also motivated by the division of
the logical and socio-emotive meaning content of language. Finally, we show that only
the Meaning First architecture provides a satisfying account of the mixing of multiple
languages by multilingual speakers, especially for cases of simultaneous articulation
across two modalities in bimodal speakers. Our view of the structure of grammar leads to
a reassessment of priorities in linguistic analyses: while current mainstream work is often
focused on establishing one-to-one relationships between concepts and morphemes,
our view makes it plausible that primitive concepts are frequently marked indirectly or
unpronounced entirely. Our view therefore assigns great value to the understanding of
logical primitives and of compression.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Several species show evidence of the formation of complex mental representations for aspects of
their social and physical environment as well as their planned actions (Bermúdez, 2007; Gallistel,
2011; Andrews and Beck, 2017; Chemla et al., 2019, and others). Humans in addition possess
a capacity to communicate complex mental representations with other humans that far exceeds
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FIGURE 1 | The Meaning First approach to language assumes that structural representations are generated outside of language and then realized by a compressor
for communication.
that of all other species in terms of scope, flexibility, and
communicative success (Hobaiter and Byrne, 2011; Schlenker
et al., 2016; Suzuki et al., 2017, and others): human language.
Though the importance of language to our species is evident,
the scientific study of human language has proved to be difficult
and contentious (Harris, 1995; Graffi, 2001; Thomas, 2020, and
others). We argue that one of the reasons for this difficulty
is that the primacy of meaning—i.e., the complex mental
representations we likely share to a large extent with other
species—has not sufficiently been taken into account. Aspects
of mental representations shared across species are expected
to be present in humans too independently of language, even
though humans unlike other species can relate complex linguistic
signals to these representations. If structured thought exists
independent of language, it calls into question most current
theorizing on language. Much current work views structure
as either emerging from statistical patterns in language use
(Goldberg, 1995; Tomasello, 2003) or as a core property of
language itself (Chomsky, 2015), which we discuss in detail later
on. But then, could structure also be available without language?
Other work allows cognitive structure independent of language,
but assumes essentially a one-to-one correspondence between
cognitive and linguistic structure (Jackendoff, 2002). But then,
how could cognitive structure be present without language being
available as well? We propose an alternative that conceives of a
new view of grammar that we think does better at explaining the
link between cognitive and linguistic structure.
Our proposal for the structure of grammar is sketched in
Figure 1, which summarizes our formal sketch in section 2. The
term Thought-system refers to a cognitive system of humans
that is at least partially shared with other species. The Generator
of the thought-system forms complex thought representations
from an inventory of logical primitives and can relate these
to memory and to sensory perception of the environment. We
view Language as a system that relates thought representations
to aspects of audiovisual signals in articulation and perception.
The Meaning First approach assumes that thought is primary,
while language is derived as a realization by the system we call
the Compressor. Our perspective entails that human thought is
organized largely independent of communication, and there is
no reason to expect thought representations to be well-suited
for communication, while we expect language to be strongly
influenced by its communicative function.1 Specifically, we argue
1Our view on the thought-language relation is related, but distinct from the view
that language itself is an instrument of thought of Chomsky (2015) and others.
Everaert et al. (2015) argue that on Chomsky’s view language itself has a property
that language involves a substantial compression of thought
representations. This allows us to address evidence for silent
structure in language. Consider briefly example (1) which we
discuss in more detail in the following section. The present tense
auxiliary do is optionally pronounced in English with only a slight
difference in meaning between the two variants.
(1) We (do) like linguistics.
We propose an account in terms of compression that requires
speakers to not pronounce “do” in normal conditions. If speakers
pronounce “do,” hearers conclude therefore that conditions are
not normal, and a manner implicature is triggered (Grice, 1989).
Compression in our view is compatible with non-pronounciation
of many parts of a thought structure as long as hearers are
sufficiently likely to reconstruct the missing pieces. Compression,
as we show in section 2, predicts manner implicatures.
In the following, we first introduce the Meaning First
approach in more formal detail focussing on the concepts of
thought and compression in section 2. Then we discuss three
key predictions of the Meaning First approach that are listed
below in the order we discuss them in this paper. All three arise
from the independence of thought and language of the Meaning
First approach. Prediction 1 addresses work that argued against
Generative Semantics almost 50 years ago, which is relevant
since the Meaning First approach bears a superficial similarity
to Generative Semantics. We show however that the Meaning
First approach makes correct predictions concerning the scope
properties of sentences and might even compare favorably to
other current views. Prediction 2 expands on existing work
in Distributed Morphology (Marantz, 1995), in particular its
concept of Late Insertion. We argue that late insertion within
the Meaning First approach can predict key properties of the
division of meaning into logical and socio-emotive aspects.
Prediction 3 concerns multilingual speakers and is confirmed
most directly in bimodal speech where speakers use both
modalities simultaneously (Emmorey et al., 2008 and others).
1. The scopal properties of sentences should be determined by
their logical properties.
2. Logical and socio-emotive aspects of meaning should
systematically differ.
3. Thought may simultaneously access two language systems.
(namely, hierarchical structure) not well-suited for communication. On our view,
hierarchical structure is a property of the thought system, but otherwise we agree
with Chomsky’s view.
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2. THOUGHTS AND COMPRESSION
The ideas we outlined in the introduction are of a programmatic
nature. In this section, we specify the central notions of
thought and compression more formally for concreteness. The
formalization is preliminary because doing so requires us tomake
several specific choices with broad consequences at this point.We
hope the formalization can serve as the basis for future empirical
work to refine these choices.
One of our basic assumptions is that of a set of primitive
concepts C. For the following, we can remain agnostic as to how
these are to be understood specifically—it could be that primitive
concepts are simply markers such as CONCEPT-A, CONCEPT-B,
. . . (or more evocatively: CAUSE, OBJECT, HUMAN, . . . ) or it may
be a set of mathematical entities as inmodel-theoretic approaches
to semantics. The latter view provides many advantages in our
opinion, but this is not the place to argue in favor of it as we can
remain agnostic.
One fairly general, formal formulation of thought is as
follows: let C be the set of primitive concepts, and MC
be the set of unordered, binary trees over C. MC is the
set of (possible) concepts. For our current purposes, we can
assume that all possible concepts are actual concepts, but
work on concept combinations frequently assumes further
well-formedness restrictions, e.g., of a type-theoretic nature
(Montague, 1970).2
Furthermore, let |H be a partial relation between a possible
world w and possible concept c. We will then say c is true in w
iff. w |H c. We say that c is a (propositional) thought iff. there is a
possible world such that w |H c.
Our formulation assumes that concept formation is a binary,
commutative recursive operation similar to the operation Merge
in Chomsky (2015).3 Our conception also assumes that possible
worlds are sufficient to capture the aspects of human non-
conceptual sensory and memory systems relevant to language
meaning (see more discussion below). At the same time, the
formulation leaves open the recursive specification of |H and a
semantic differentiation of concepts (including primitive ones)
that are never true of a possible world—i.e., contradictory
concepts are not thoughts by the above definition (Chierchia,
2013 and others).
Now we turn to compression. A minimal formal
characterization of compression is based on the exponence
relation → of Distributed Morphology (Halle and Marantz,
1993; Keine, 2013 and others). Exponence relates some concepts
(primitive or complex) to possible Messages (or phrases) of the
language including a null message ∅. For concreteness, the reader
2The Meaning First approach requires that restrictions on possible concept
combination must be independent of language. But the independence is difficult
to verify since most work on concept combination that we know of is based on
the formal semantics of language and in formal models the borderline between
properties of language and of the conceptual calculus is difficult to pin down. For
example, type-theoretic restrictions can be captured in the formal ontology as well
as in a categorial grammar (Ajdukiewicz, 1935, and others).
3In algebra, our conception is called the minimal commutative free magma over
C. The commutative magma differs only for “self-merge” of a concept c with
itself from Chomsky’s Merge (Sauerland and Paul, 2017). We prefer the algebraic
conception for its greater clarity.
may assume that the set of messages is a set of strings, i.e., a free
monoid with concatenation over a set of articulatory feature
structures. Exponence relations may furthermore be subject to a
context restriction. A context restriction r is derived by replacing
from a concept r′ one node or subtree with the symbol “ ”.4
We write c −→ e | r to indicate c can be exponed by e if r is
satisfied. We understand that an occurrence of c as a part of
structure s satisfies r iff. there is a node c′ of s containing the
occurrence of c such that replacing that occurrence of c with
renders c′ and r identical. For example, the present tense,
PRESENT, can be exponed in English either with “do” or, if a
direct sister to verb phrase, with the null morpheme. The English
grammar is captured by the two exponence relations in (2).5
(2) a. PRESENT −→ “do”
b. PRESENT −→ ∅ | [ [ α β ] ]
where α is concept that can be exponed by a verb,
and β is any concept6
We define a general exponence relation H⇒ that derives
sentences by recursive reference to −→-relations and a
linearization function ℓ (see below). We define an auxiliary
notion of
c
H⇒ where c is the structure in which context
restrictions apply, and then c H⇒ s, (to be pronounced as “the
thought c can be exponed by s”), is defined as c
c
H⇒ s. The latter,
we define recursively as c
c′
H⇒ m iff. either c −→ m | r in c′
or c is structure with the two subconstituent c1 and c2 and m
is the concatenation of m1 and m2 in the order ℓ(c1,m1, c2,m2)
of the linearization function7 and c1
c
H⇒ m1 and c2
c
H⇒ m2.
The set of expressible thoughts is {c | ∃s c H⇒ s}. Assuming for
simplicity thatWE, LIKE, and LINGUISTICS are primitive concepts
and exponed by “we,” “like,” and “linguistics,” respectively, (3-a)
is predicted to have two exponents, (3-b) and (3-c).
(3) a. [ WE [ PRESENT [ LIKE LINGUISTICS ]]]
b. H⇒We like linguistics.
c. H⇒We do like linguistics.
Example (3) illustrates a problem: (3-b) and (3-c) intuitively do
not mean the same. We still need to account for the fact that
only (3-b) may be used to express (3-a). We do so by introducing
the notion of compression to capture manner implicatures (Rett,
2014, and others). We define a cost function as a k that maps
a message m to its cost k(m) with k(∅) = 0 and k(ab) ≥ k(a)
and k(ab) ≥ b. Furthermore we assume that there is a measure
of probability of understanding specific thoughts by the receiver
4Evidently, “ ” must not be a primitive concept to avoid mix-ups.
5Our treatment of exponence is abbreviated, which forces us to state the contextual
restriction in (2-b) in an inelegant statement referring to possible exponents
of α. See especially the contributions in Trommer (2012) for a discussion of
how exponence of one concept can be linked to the exponence of others in the
same structure.
6We assume that all verbs including intransitive ones expone complex concepts,
e.g. consisting of the category concept VERB and an acategorial root.
7The concept of linearization would need to be expanded for phenomena in
language that are not linearly ordered. But we think such an extension would be
straightforward and omit it here for perspicuity.
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of m, i.e., a probability distribution P(— | m) on the set of
expressible thoughts.
Finally we define a compression function as follows: E is a
compression function iff. E maps any expressible thought c to an
exponent E(c) [i.e., c H⇒ E(c)] and there is no cheaper message
with higher likelihood of reconstructing c:8 i.e., there must be no
m with c H⇒ m with k(m) ≤ k[E(c)] and P({c} | m) ≥ P[{c} |
E(c)]. Intuitively, a compression function can be understood as
a licit way of relating thoughts to exponents. We will say that c
can be expressed as sentence s if there is a compression function
mapping c to s.
Compression can derive the manner implicature in example
(1) as follows: If (3-a) is the only expressible thought, there are
two candidates for a compression function: E1 maps (3-a) to
(3-b), and E2 maps (3-a) to (3-c). Assume also that both (3-b) and
(3-c) have probability 1 of being understood as (3-a), as seems
reasonable if (3-a) is the only thought that could be expressed
as either. But if the cost k(“do”) is greater than 0, the cost of
(3-b) will be less than the cost of (3-c). These assumptions taken
together entail that E2 is not a compression function because the
cost of (3-c) is greater than that of (3-b) while the likelihood of c
being understood is the same for both sentences. E1, however, is
a compression function.
If we assume that any pronounced material has some cost,
we predict that ellipsis must be obligatory whenever it can be
reconstructed.9 Specifically, we predict that generally periphrasis
cannot express a thought c if there is a compressed way of
expressing c, even if periphrasis is a possible exponent of c.
Two classical cases that can be handled in the same way
are the relation of “kill” to “cause to die” (Fodor, 1970),
and comparison with antonyms as in “less tall” vs. “smaller”
(Bierwisch, 1967; Rett, 2014; Moracchini, 2019, and others). To
derive that periphrastic forms like (3-c) are not ungrammatical,
but have a marked meaning, we adopt the idea of Rett (2014)
that periphrasis and other apparent optional pronounciation
indicates the presence of additional structure.10 Specifically, we
predict that the thought (4) could be exponed as (3-c), but
8Note that compression derives much of the effect of morphological specificity
(Bobaljik and Sauerland, 2018 and others): If two possible exponents have the
same cost, the more specific one must be used. We hope future work will compare
this corollary with standard specifity empirically. In future work, we also plan
to consider a version of compression that is sensitive not to the likelihood of
reconstruction of c, but to the expected utility of the reconstructed thought(s).
9The same applies to non-pronounciation in cases not usually referred to as ellipsis.
One reviewer brings up the interesting case of the English complementizer that
as a potential counterexample presenting free optionality between pronounciation
and non-pronounciation. Levy and Jaeger (2007) show, however, that the
presence/absence of that is affected by meaning disambiguation. Though it
remains to be seen whether this result can carry over to other structures, the
evidence we are aware of is in our favor.
10The presence of additional structure may also underlie additional positions for
temporal, modal, or event information. At least the non-substitutability of cause to
die by kill in (i) and maybe some other classical cases can be accounted for in this
way. At this point, we are not aware of any acute problems with treating all cases of
non-equivalence of possible exponents as manner implicatures. Finding cases that
cannot be accounted for by manner implicature would be very interesting since it
might indicate that a primitive and composed concept could be equivalent.
(i) John caused Bill to die on Sunday by stabbing him on
Sunday (Fodor, 1970)
not as (3-b) because the context restriction of relation (2-b)
isn’t satisfied.
(4) [ WE [ [ FOCUS PRESENT ] [ LIKE LINGUISTICS ]]]
Across languages we expect compression and especially non-
pronounciation to vary depending on the morphology of a
language. But does tenselessness in languages like St’át’imcets
(Matthewson, 2006), Halkomelem and Blackfoot (Ritter and
Wiltschko, 2009) really only amount to the non-pronounciation
of tense? Before we return to tense further, consider briefly the
subject of a verbal predicate, i.e., subjectlessness. A rich linguistic
literature shows that universally subjects are present,11 but they
may be unpronounced in some languages and environments.
Such null subjects are indicated as pro or PRO following
(Chomsky, 1981). These findings corroborate the Meaning First
approach because it assumes that at the conceptual level the
subject position must be instantiated independently of whether
its content is pronounced. Furthermore work on pro-drop
languages finds a relationship between morphological properties
and the pronounciation of the subject as the Meaning First
approach predicts (Rizzi, 1982; Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou,
1998, and others). Now let us return to tenseless languages
where there is currently a debate: On the one hand, Matthewson
(2006) and others present evidence that tenselessness is similarly
superficial as subjectlessness is. On the other hand, Ritter and
Wiltschko (2009) and Wiltschko (2014) argue that tense is only
a subcategory of an event anchor along with person and location,
and that at least one subcategory of the event anchor must be
pronounced. The Meaning First approach is compatible with
various outcomes of further empirical investigation. For example,
we could assume that a specification of an event anchor triplet is
universally present at the conceptual level, but that the values of
the time, location and person specification are predictable from
one-another.12 Compression would then predict that only one of
the three specifications should ever be expressed (and none in the
environments where infinitives occur).
Nominal conjunction provides a case where generally
compression is not optional. Consider uses of and combining
two proper names as in (5-a), where Boolean and is not directly
applicable. Adapting a proposal by Winter (1996) and Mitrović
and Sauerland (2016) argue that (5-a) should be analyzed as
sketched in (5-b), where the subset relation applies to yield two
constituents that Boolean and can apply to.13
11For ease of presentation, we put aside some cases of infinitivals that are generally
taken to have no subject position (Wurmbrand, 2001 and others). These exceptions
are fully consistent with the general picture we draw, and strengthen the argument
that inmost environments silent arguments are represented at the conceptual level.
12Predictability applies only at the specified level of granularity, not for the exact
time, location, and participants of an event. We specifically assume±past,±distal,
and ±local following (Ritter and Wiltschko, 2009). It seems plausible to us that
relevant past events also are also more likely than present events to have occurred
in distal locations and have involved non-local participants, but as far as we know
this remains to be empirically studied.
13We use sans-serif boldface for logical concepts and strike-out to indicate that
a concept remains unpronounced. We tacitly assume here that “min” is the
minimum operator and the model-theoretic interpretation of structure (5-b)
amounts to the paraphrase: The minimal set X that has both Mary and Bill as
elements has the property “happy.” See Mitrović and Sauerland (2016) for the
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(5) a. Mary and Bill are happy. (ENGLISH)
b. min-X [[Mary part-of X] and [Bill part-of X]]
are happy.
The part-of relation can be expressed by of in other environments
in English, and the closely related subset-of relation can be
expressed by every and other universal quantifiers according
to generalized quantifier theory (Barwise and Cooper, 1981),
but not in (5-a). Mitrović and Sauerland (2016) argue that
Japanese and other languages contrast with English with respect
to which elements of a nominal coordination are expressed. For
example, nominal coordination in (6-a) contains two occurrences
of mo which in other environments can also express universal
quantification. Hence,Mitrović and Sauerland (2016) provide the
analysis sketched in (6-b) wheremo expresses the subset relation










b. min-X [[Marymo X] and [Billmo X]] genki desu
That compression applies with different results in different
languages is, we believe, frequently the case. The cross-linguistic
variation of kind reference is another case in point. Chierchia
(1998) discusses contrasts such as (7) between English and
Italian. He argues that while in Italian the definite determiner
must be pronounced, kind reference in English also involves a
definite determiner, but one that is not pronounced. If Chierchia’s
analysis is correct, pronounciation of the definite marker as the is
blocked in English (7-a), but required in Italian (7-b).










Beyond the concrete analyses discussed in this section already,
compression also has some theoretical utility for understanding
the Effability Hypotheses that each conceivable thought can be
expressed verbally (Katz, 1976; von Fintel andMatthewson, 2008,
and others). Our formal notions of thought and compression
allow us to distinguish three different flavors of effability.
Two flavors of effability arise directly from the Meaning First
approach: Conceptual Effability says that for any two possible
worlds w1 and w2 that are perceptually discriminable there is
a thought c that is true in w1 and false in w2 or vice versa.
Compression Effability is satisfied if there exists a compression
function for the set of all thoughts. Our model does not predict
either flavor of effability to be necessarily true. But furthermore,
even if a language satisfies both conceptual and compression
effability, there is a third sense of effability that it may not satisfy.
Namely with Transmission Effability, we mean that any thought
c can be communicated by the message E(c)14. For example,
the compression function that maps any thought to silence, ∅,
details of the proposal that we have to omit here, and Haslinger et al. (2019) for
further discussion.
14More specifically, P[{c} | E(c)] > P[{c′} | E(c)] for any two thoughts c, c′. We
see this characterization only as a starting point, and future versions could make
reference not to the formal identity of c and c′, but to equivalence.
satisfies compression effability, but cannot satisfy transmission
effability unless there is only a single thought. In sum, the
Meaning First approach allows more specific flavors of effability,
but to what extent the different flavors of effability are satisfied
remains an empirical question.
The presence of unpronounced material in linguistic
structure, and in particular in the three cases of compression
presented above, is debated in linguistics. The debate concerns
the relation between conceptual structure and articulated
form: is the relation between the two rather “simple” and
“direct,” or rather is the thought internal concept composition
uniform? Much research in linguistics has favored a one-to-
one mapping between the primitive concepts and articulated
linguistic elements as illustrated by (6) –for example, both
Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987) and Montague Grammar
(Montague, 1970) place great value on such directness. From
the Meaning First perspective, though, the motivation for a
one-to-one mapping seems questionable: on this view, the
one-to-one mapping would be stated as a requirement that each
primitive element of a thought must be articulated if a thought
is communicated15. But while communication is subject to the
optimization principles of information theory (Shannon, 1948;
Hale, 2016), we would be surprised to find that the thought
system is subject to information-theoretic principles in the same
way. Engineered solutions frequently use different data formats
for internal processing and for transmission to another machine;
one highly redundant representation that can be easily processed,
the other highly compressed. Our approach places much higher
value on the uniformity of operations at the conceptual level since
it recognizes as separate the compression system language and
the underlying thought structures. Compression distinguishes
the Meaning First approach from other approaches to grammar
including Generative Semantics because compression allows the
different possible exponents of a structure to receive different
interpretation, which the model of Katz and Postal (1964)
excluded. At this point, evidence for compression remains
preliminary since thought structures need to be ascertained.16
We put compression aside for now, and focus in the remainder of
the paper on the three other sources of evidence of the Meaning
First approach mentioned in the introduction.
3. SCOPE RELATIONS
For about 50 years the T-Model17 architecture of grammar
sketched in Figure 2 has held sway: structures are generated
within grammar itself and then are fed to two interfaces, the LF-
interface with the conceptual system and the PF-interface with
the systems for articulation and perception.18 The Meaning First
15Within Distributed Morphology, Siddiqi (2006) implements similar intuitions.
Benz’s (2012) game-theoretic Error Model provides a related rationale for the
non-articulation of conceptually present material.
16There is substantial evidence for compression at the word-level since the work of
Zipf (1932). This is not directly related to our concerns, but also corroborates the
Meaning First approach.
17The term T-model is due to Chomsky and Lasnik (1977).
18We put aside the addition of the cycle to this conception where the T-model
architecture applies within phases (Chomsky, 2015) since our discussion in the
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FIGURE 2 | The T-model of language assumes that structural representations are generated within language and produce a thought-articulation pair.
approach instead advocates an architecture where a conceptual
representation is generated outside of grammar, which the
linguistic system then packages for communication. In this
section, we address the empirical argument in favor of the T-
model based on scope relations (Chomsky, 1970; Jackendoff,
1972). Chomsky (1970) actually discusses two arguments in
favor of the conclusion that grammatical operations affect
interpretation, but the second one based on intonational focus
has already lost its force. Specifically the discovery that focus
can be articulated solely by segmental affixes in, for example,
Wolof (Rialland and Robert, 2001) and Chickasaw (Gordon,
2008) has supported an analysis of focus in English as affixes too,
but ones that are articulated by intonational means. The affixal
analysis of focus does not require the T-model because an affix
can uncontroversially expone a part of a conceptual structure.
Consider now the argument from scope relations in favor
of the T-model. It is based on the empirical generalization that
the linear order of exponents (also called overt word order)
affects scopal relations. Initial empirical evidence came from data
such as (8) (Jackendoff, 1969; Chomsky, 1970), where the word
order of the quantifier many and negation correlates with the
preferred interpretation.19
(8) a. Many arrows didn’t hit the target. (many≫ not, ?not
≫many)
b. Not many arrows hit the target. (*many ≫ not, not
≫many)
c. The target wasn’t hit by many arrows. (??many ≫
not, not≫many)
Paradigm (8) argues against the Generative Semantics account
where (8-b) and (8-c) articulate the same conceptual structure
as (8-a). But the Meaning First approach assumes that three
following relates to phenomena taking place within a single phase. Also Bobaljik
(1995) and Bobaljik and Wurmbrand (2012) propose a departure from the T-
model, but still view structure generation as part of syntax unlike the Meaning
First approach.
19The relevant data become sharper with comparative quantifiers like more than
three arrows (Takahashi, 2006; Fleisher, 2013).
different conceptual structures underlie the sentences in (8)
(Sauerland, 2018): In (8-b), the position of not would reflect
different positions of negation in the conceptual structure, and
the passive morphology in (8-c) indicates the presence of a
primitive concept, PASS (Alexiadou et al., 2015 and others), not
present in (8-a).
Though most work on the syntax-semantics interface has
assumed the T-model, only few of the results accomplished
actually depend on this architecture as far as we know. We are
optimistic that it is possible to reconsider such results fruitfully
within the Meaning First approach. Specifically one influential
paradigm of data supporting the T-model was presented by
Fox (2000). Fox’s analysis takes the T-model for granted, but is
interesting because it crucially relies on the distinction between
overt and covert operations that is available only in the T-
model (see also Reinhart, 2006). But Sauerland (2018) suggests
an approach to Fox’s data within the Meaning First approach
that might hold some advantages over Fox’s account. In sum,
we have shown that the two main existing arguments from
scope in favor of the T-model are actually consistent with the
Meaning First approach, and points to avenues for further
empirical investigation.
4. LATE INSERTION AND THE DIVISION OF
CONTENT
In this section, we argue that the Late Insertion of lexical material
the Meaning First approach allows a natural account of the
division of content between logical and socio-emotive aspects.
We will contextualize our proposal in light of discussions within
Distributed Morphology on Late Insertion, but note that the
work of Bock and Levelt (1994) and others on speech production
bears many similarities to Distributed Morphology. Distributed
Morphology is a realizational theory of morphology. It assumes
that there is a separation between the syntactic-semantic content
of morphemes and the articulatory instructions required for its
exponence for communication. Vocabulary Insertion describes
the provision of phonological exponence to morphemes. For
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example, vocabulary insertion realizes the syntactic and semantic
features for 3rd person singular in combination with present
tense information with verbs like see in English by realizing
them with a voiced “z”. The term Late Insertion indicates that
vocabulary insertion takes place after a structural representation
is formed. Within Distributed Morphology it is debated whether
Late Insertion applies universally to all morphemes including
roots. Unlike Distributed Morphology, the Meaning First
approach is committed to Universal Late Insertion because
the Meaning First approach locates the structure generation
outside of grammar while Distributed Morphology views it as
part of grammar. We present existing evidence and argue that
the Meaning First approach overcomes a conceptual problem
that Late Insertion poses for Distributed Morphology. Then we
develop a new argument for Universal Late Insertion from the
division of content.
While Late Insertion of functional and inflectional
morphemes is a hallmark of Distributed Morphology, Late
Insertion of roots has been controversial. Marantz (1995) argued
that the process of Late Insertion applies both to inflectional
and other functional morphemes as well as to roots. The Late
Root Hypothesis was substantiated on the basis of a series
of arguments. First, Marantz argued, phonological material
seems irrelevant for the syntactic derivation. Second, meaning
differences between roots are not relevant for syntax (e.g., cat vs.
dog). Thirdly, while the difference between roots and functional
morphemes is descriptively useful, there is little evidence to
argue that it affects the basic generative system. These arguments
led Marantz to propose that Vocabulary “is the output of a
grammatical derivation, not the input to the computational
system” (Marantz, 1995, p. 411) and thus universal late insertion.
Marantz (1995) notes that universal late insertion in Distributed
Morphology requires a link between phonological and semantic
information that is not mediated by the syntax:20 two concepts
that have identical syntactic behaviors, e.g., cat and dog, are
represented in the same way in the syntax, but have different
pronounciations and interpretations. Marantz (1995) leaves
the cat-dog problem open while Harley (2014) suggests that the
root terminal nodes could be notated via indexes. Universal late
insertion was criticized and rejected in later work by Embick
(2000) and Embick and Noyer (2007), who adopt late insertion
for functional morphemes only. But more recently, Pfau (2000),
Haugen and Siddiqi (2013), de Belder and van Craenenbroeck
(2015) and others argue in favor of universal late insertion. The
Meaning First architecture requires universal late insertion after
formation of a structure, but it avoids the cat-dog problem of
Marantz (1995). The realization process maps semantic concepts
to their articulation instructions, e.g., cat −→ “cat,” while
dog −→ “dog”.
The Meaning First approach also sheds new light on the
possible identification of grammatical features. It has been
observed that the distinction between innate concepts vs. those
that are based on experience (Carey, 2009, and others) predicts
quite well which features grammar can access; for example,
20The assumption that syntax links phonology and semantics is part of the T-model
of grammar. See also section 3 above.
the innate conceptual distinctions between a single object and
a plurality or between the present and the past frequently
are accessed by grammar, while the distinction between cat
and dog and others like it never are.21 Most approaches of
Minimalist syntax assume that there is an innate finite inventory
of grammatical features (Chomsky, 2015) (though e.g., Biberauer
and Roberts, 2016 disagree). As we mentioned already, Marantz
(1995) implements the sole sensitivity of syntax to grammatical
feature by universal late insertion. But on the Meaning First
approach assumes any information in a concept could be
available to grammar. If the link between grammaticality and
innateness of a feature was incorrect (Biberauer and Roberts,
2016), this would therefore speak in favor of the Meaning
First approach. However, we also think that if the link between
grammaticality and innateness of a feature is correct, it can be
insightfully implemented within the Meaning First approach.
Specifically, being a grammatical feature in the terminology of
section 2 above, means that a conceptual property can occur
in the environment condition of exponence relations. Chierchia
(2013) and Del Pinal (2019) argue that the innate features are
also logical and not affected by contextual adjustment. Therefore,
we suggest that environment restrictions in the Meaning First
approach are restricted to logical concepts to capture the
syntactic status of grammatical features.
We now argue that the Meaning First approach can provide
an account of the division of semantic content between logical
and socio-emotive meaning widely assumed in socio-linguistics
(Eckert, 2018). The account is based on the assumption that the
signals language relies on for communication (i.e., the exponents)
can in addition to their exponence relation associate with socio-
emotive impact. We assume the socio-emotive associations are
direct, non-compositional links between an exponent and socio-
emotive similar to associations from facial expression or clothing
style serve to communicate socio-emotive aspects. We show
that a model of socio-emotive content within the Meaning
First approach based on the assumption of exponent-based
association predicts some key properties dividing logical and
socio-emotive content.
Consider first that any use of the morpheme dog carries with it
further meanings: it may be realized with a gesture (dog + smile),
with a phonetic variant (Labov, 1966), with an emoticon dog :-),
quoted “dog,” spelled d-o-g, or lengthened dooog, and all variants
serve to communicate some further layers of meaning such as
the speaker’s attitude toward dogs or a particular dog, but also
other aspects of the speaker’s state of mind. Semantic research
has found, though, that semantic meaning can be broadly divided
into two; we use the terms logical and socio-emotive meaning
(Potts, 2005; Gutzmann, 2015; Eckert, 2018).22 We assume that
21Adger (2019) discusses the interesting case of symmetry.Why does the difference
between symmetric things like faces and asymmetric ones like constellations never
enter grammar?We suggest that the notion of symmetry unlike those of object and
time is not an innate constituent of our cognitive system, but that our perceptual
systems make symmetry universally salient to us. Hence symmetry would be
innate, but not in the sense relevant to grammar.
22Gutzmann (2015) uses the terms truth-conditional for our logical and use-
conditional for our socio-emotive. Two criteria distinguishing the two types is that
socio-emotive content generally doesn’t compositionally interact with other parts
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the thought structure constitutes the logical meaning, while the
socio-emotive aspects are arise from the use of an expression.23
A useful criterion to distinguish between the components is
provided by structures that require an identity of logical meaning
(Potts et al., 2009). For example, socio-emotive meaning can
be added to the second occurrence of president in (9), but not
logical meaning.24






































The Meaning First approach can predict the relevant
identity requirement by assuming the conceptual representation
sketched in (10) for all exponents in (9), where the concept
president occurs in two positions. We propose furthermore that
socio-emotive content can affect the process of realization at
each occurrence.
(10) I’ll talk with the
president
—, and the — alone.
Our novel evidence in (11-a) shows that this mechanism can
also lead to clear-cut cases of late insertion of a root.25 In (11),
ellipsis applies in the question by B, but the pejorative component



















“I saw your fleabag in the park.”—“In which park did
you see my dog?”
Adopting ideas of Adger and Smith (2010), we assume that
German provides at least two different exponents for the dog
concept. We write these as in (12), where in (12-a) socio-
emotive side effect of the exponent are indicated as explained
of the sentence and that it is irrelevant to many semantic identity requirements as
we discuss in the following. Both tests are as far as we know not unequivocal and
can be difficult to apply. Further criteria such as translatability (McCready, 2014)
may also exist.
23Our view might allow us to capture medical conditions such as copralalia as
a dissociation of the two logical and socio-emotive systems (Van Lancker and
Cummings, 1999 and others).
24These data are due to Potts et al. (2009) except for the second and third variant,
which are based on Tieu et al. (2017).
25The English example (i) from Potts et al. (2009) is related, but German packages
fucking dog into the single noun Köter (“cur/fleabag”) (Gutzmann, 2011). While
the gloss cur suggests mixed race, the German Köter does not carry such a
implication, but may be related to Kot (“excrement”/“dirt”) or the barking sound.
(i) A: I saw your fucking dog in the park.
B: No you didn’t—you couldn’t have. The poor thing passed away
last week.
in the following. For ellipsis licensing, we assume that only the
conceptual level matters.
(12) a. dog−→ “Köter” (⇑ disgust, ⇓ formal)
b. dog−→ “Hund”
We use the label Intrusion for cases where socio-emotive
content affects exponence. Consider briefly a starting point
toward a model of intrusion: Assume that there is a function
a mapping an exponent e and a socio-emotive property p to
one of −1, 0, and 1. The arrow notations in (12-a), we take to
indicate that a(“Köter”, disgust) = 1 and a(“Köter”, formal) =
−1, while the value of a is 0 whenever it is not indicated. For
some properties, speakers aim for the closest possible match
between concept exponed and the socio-emotive properties of the
exponent. This is responsible for intrusive use of Köter instead
of Hund for dog by individuals disgusted by dogs. Furthermore
speakers can adopt targets for properties like “formal” that they
consider appropriate for a specific situation, e.g., τformal = 1.
If we evaluate closest fit by the Euclidean distance between
the target disgust-formal pair and the disgust-formal pair of
the exponent, we correctly predict intrusive uses of “Hund”
by dog-haters in situations they perceive to require formal
speech. The model we layed out is evidently a toy model that is
insufficient to capture all relevant phenomena (see Gutzmann,
2019 and others for more sophisticated models, but starting
from different assumptions). But we find the restritiveness of the
toy-model attractive, in particular it predicts that socio-emotive
meaning can be restricted to only the current exponent and the
concept exponed. If this restriction is corroborated by more data,
socio-emotive intrusion may represent a residue of prelinguistic
communication abilities.
Via intrusion, the Meaning First approach allows contentful
late insertion of socio-emotive components of meaning, and
there is empirical evidence for it. The Meaning First approach
also predicts, as we saw, crucial aspects of socio-emotive meaning
components,26 namely their non-compositional nature and their
lack of interaction with other semantic content of the sentence.27
5. MULTIPLE LANGUAGES
In this section, we will focus on the third prediction of the
Meaning First approach, namely that thought can simultaneously
access two language systems.28 We rely on recent work on
multilingual individuals that has shown that such individuals
frequently mix two or more languages, but also that such
mixing is subject to non-trivial structural restrictions (López
et al., 2017 and others). The evidence supports a view
26A reviewer raises the possibility of adding a social meaning system to the
phonology branch within a T-model grammar. We think it would be interesting to
spell out such a system, but expect that once spelled out such a model would bear
key similarities to the Meaning First model. Specifically it would need to make sure
that a particular use of Köter (“cur”) needs to relate to a particular referent.
27Furthermore the non-translatability of socio-emotive content (McCready, 2014)
is also captured by the link between intrusion and specific exponents in the
Meaning First approach.
28We believe that other transfer phenomena in bilinguals (Jarvis and Pavlenko,
2008) also are supportive of the Meaning First approach, but less unequivocally so
than the evidence we discuss here.
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FIGURE 3 | The Meaning First model of bimodal speech: Two compressors realize a single thought representation simultaneously in the two modalities.
where some aspects of grammar are language independent
and therefore also apply when two languages are mixed.
Previous theoretical work on multilingualism has focused on
Distributed Morphology, which we discussed already in the
previous section. Our view in this section is that much of the
evidence is compatible with both Distributed Morphology and
the Meaning First approach, but some more recent evidence
from code-blending specifically supports the Meaning First
approach. We first briefly discuss code-mixing and then focus on
code-blending.
Work on code-mixing has shown that bilinguals use different
vocabulary items to realize a unified abstract structure. For
example, Alexiadou (2017) and Alexiadou and Lohndal (2018)
show that bilinguals create novel forms consisting of roots
from one language combined with affixes from another. The
grammar of such forms is governed by rules, e.g., Alexiadou
and Lohndal (2018) discuss grammatical gender in Greek-
German code-mixing: a stem like Kass (“cash register”) from
the feminine class in German must be marked with feminine
morphology i Káss-a (“the cash register”) in code-mixing, even
though the Greek translation tami-o (“cash register”) belongs
to the neuter class. Cases of such sub-lexical mixing argue that
language mixing is based on an integrated language-independent
structural representation as both Distributed Morphology and
the Meaning First approach assume. The realization mechanism
can then be switched at certain points while a structure is realized
(López et al., 2017).
Code-blending provides evidence that favors the Meaning
First approach over Distributed Morphology. Code-blending
involves a mix of signed and spoken utterances which are to some
extent produced simultaneously in the twomodalities by bimodal
speakers (Emmorey et al., 2008, and others). Branchini and
Donati (2016) report examples like (13) where the word order
of negation and verb differs in the two simultaneous utterances,
namely the correct word order of the individual languages is used
for both.
(13) ITALIAN/LIS (Italian Sign Language) (Branchini and










Though Branchini and Donati (2016) suggest an analysis of
their data within Distributed Morphology, this would require an
extension of morphology to word order variation. As Figure 3
illustrates, the Meaning First approach, however, predicts data
like (13) if two articulation mechanisms operate in parallel and
each produces the appropriate word order.29
The view of Branchini and Donati (2016) would furthermore
lead to two distinct logical form representations for the LIS
and Italian sentences, which could have different interpretations.
But the Meaning First approach predicts that the interpretations
must be parallel since both articulations derive from the
same conceptual representation. The latter view in addition
to being more plausible, is empirically supported by some
still unpublished work: (Lillo-Martin, 2019, slide 39) reports
data from idiom interpretation in bimodals. Namely, she
tested English-ASL bilinguals on utterances of an ASL sentence
simultaneous with an English sentence that contains an idiom.
For example, she reports that a simultaneous utterance of
ASL NOT WORRY SMALL PROBLEM with English Don’t
cry over over spilled milk.—i.e., meaning parallelism without
morphological parallelism—is judged much more acceptable
than the reverse. The Distributed Morphology view does
not predict an interpretive link of this kind: the English
29We expect that the independent operation of two articulation mechanisms will
be constrained by performance factors (Petroj et al., 2014). Rodrigo et al. (2019)
provide corroborating evidence from priming that bilinguals represent sentences
independent of word order.
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grammar should independently of the ASL grammar select either
the idiomatic or non-idiomatic interpretation. However, the
Meaning First approach predicts that the interpretations must
be the same since both structures must derive from the same
thought structure.
6. CONCLUSION
We have presented three arguments for the Meaning First
approach to grammar. This approach proposes that language
structure derives from the structure of logical thought as sketched
in Figure 1. But not all pieces of a thought structure need to
be realized in language: Many pieces may be predictable from
the presence of some key fragments with enough reliability to
allow communication to be successful. Therefore, realization in
the Meaning First approach consists primarily of compression.
At the same time, other cognitive faculties may intrude on the
realization of thought structures in language. Especially, we have
talked about socio-emotive attitudes, which often find expression
in or alongside language, but interact only in limited ways with
logical meaning, if at all. We conclude that a Meaning First
approach to grammar should be considered in more detail in the
future as we plan to do.
A central goal of linguistic theory is to predict the set of
possible languages; i.e., those learnable by typical individuals.
How does the Meaning First approach constrain the set of
possible languages? In two important domains, it can build
on existing lines of research: the work by Gärdenfors (2000)
on constraints on the set of primitive concepts and the work
in syntax and Distributed Morphology on linearization and
realization relations (e.g., Embick, 2010; Richards, 2010; Smith
et al., 2019, and others). The former govern how much
information can be packaged into a single concept, while the
latter govern to what extent this packaging can be altered by
compression. As an example of this interaction between the
conceptual and morphological constraints, consider the results
of Bobaljik (2012) on adjective gradation. Bobaljik argues that
the superlative cannot be a primitive concept, but is always
conceptually represented as a complex of the comparative
concept and maximality as in (14-c). He furthermore argues
that the morphology is universally constrained in such a way
that a exponence rule for an adjective concept cannot have an
environment condition that is only satisfied by the positive and
the superlative conceptual structure, excluding the comparative.
With these assumptions, Bobaljik derives the *ABA universal
he establishes, namely that the hypothetical ABA-language in
(14) with the gradation sequence bonus–melior-*bonimus is not
a possible human language.
(14) a. Positive: good H⇒ Latin: “bonus,” English: “good,”
ABA-language: “bonus”
b. Comparative: [good more] H⇒ Latin: “melior,”
English: “better,” ABA-language: “melior”
c. Superlative: [[good more] maximal]
H⇒ Latin: optimus, English: “best,”
ABA-language: *“bonimus”
Painstaking empirical work such as Bobaljik’s remains necessary
to establish constraints on how both basic concepts and the
compression component are constrained on the Meaning First
approach as much as for other approaches. These remarks
apply mutatis mutandis to constraints in other components
of the model such as concept combination, intrusion, and
the possible cyclic conception of the Meaning First approach.
We expect though that the focus on primitive concepts and
their exponence on the Meaning First approach provides a
better space to integrate such work than frameworks like
Montague grammar (Montague, 1970) that do not allow for a
morphological component.
The Meaning First approach therefore has major
repercussions for how we investigate language and thought. First
of all, we cannot separate the study of the two if grammatical
structure is derived from thought structure. But the presence of
compression and intrusion also means that a thought structure
may differ substantially from the sentence used to communicate
it. In particular, the thought structure may be much more
complex—for all we know, language may achieve compression
rates of 10 primitive concepts to one morpheme or even 100 : 1.
Furthermore, the Meaning First approach provides two different
avenues language may affect thought (i.e., the phenomenon
of linguistic relativity, Deutscher, 2011): On the one hand,
languages may express different logical or acquired concepts and
therefore require speakers of one language to attend to a specific
distinction more frequently than speakers of other languages,
and thereby become more practiced in drawing that distinction.
On the other hand, compression to language itself may support
thought as a kind of mnemonic. Specifically we speculate that
complex thought representations may be difficult to process, but
their processing aided by temporarily storing parts of them by
means of a compressed articulatory representation. For example,
inner speech aiding memory may explain the effect of language
on certain theory of mind tasks (de Villiers and de Villiers,
2000; Sauerland, 2020, and others). Most importantly, though,
the Meaning First approach brings to attention that we know
very little about the principles of thought structure and the
process of compression. The potential examples of compression
we discussed in the section 2 and Bobaljik’s case illustrate
some of the analytical techniques to make concrete progress by
comparing different languages and seeking overall simplicity. We
think exciting progress can be made by applying such techniques
widely as well as by indentifying further sources of evidence.
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